It is a common misconception that women, solely based on their gender, form a homogenous group. They do not. And neither do the women and girls supporting ISIS/Da’esh. Research shows the women who joined ISIS/Da’esh have different socio-demographic profiles and background stories. Their motivations range from a quest for belonging, the aspiration to help build a utopian Islamic state, to belong to something bigger and divine and a (perceived) moral duty to support their Muslim brothers and sisters, to a sense of adventure, the prospect of marriage, or a combination thereof. Another misconception is that female radicalisation can be explained as a single-causal process, predominantly fed by emotional or personal factors. It has long been acknowledged that radicalisation is a complex, multi-causal phenomenon. Understanding and responding to female radicalisation requires the same multi-layered approach. In addition, where men are mostly considered active players in their radicalisation, women are reduced to passive actors. Their radicalisation is perceived as a situation that happens to them, rather than a process they are a part of. These gendermisconceptions hinder an adequate response to the phenomenon of female radicalisation. Any serious attempt to prevent or counter female radicalisation must acknowledge the diversity of women and should avoid generalisations and oversimplifications. In addition, gender misconceptions and gender stereotypes affect the space for women to contribute to PVE/CVE programmes and related initiatives. Often, women are included in these programmes as mothers, sisters and wives, based on their supposed ideal position to signal early warning signs of radicalisation. While women can be valuable assets in prevention and intervention programmes in this capacity, it reinforces gender stereotypes and ignores women’s capabilities to contribute in many other areas. Different studies and experts point out that women can play a vital role as policy shapers, educators, community members and activists.
Recommendations for policy-makers on including women in their programming:
Facilitate and stimulate local, grassroots initiatives. In general, it has been acknowledged that bottom-up prevention efforts are more effective than top-down approaches. Local, grassroots initiatives are aware of the situation in their communities and enjoy the trust of the communities they are part of. Therefore, such initiatives are often better positioned to identify community grievances, making them potential key-partners in (drawing up) effective prevention programmes. On the other hand, local initiatives can benefit from existing (academic) expertise on radicalisation. An alliance between local initiatives and government institutions optimises prevention efforts;
Avoid demonising specific groups. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has three suggestions how to accomplish this. First, the focus of prevention efforts should have a multi-ethnic approach rather than engaging with specific ethnoreligious groups to avoid labelling. Second, prevention efforts should strictly be led by civil society organisations, with no connection to security or intelligence operations. Security-led interventions should be reserved for countering initiatives. The specific relevance of this is also underscored in the UK case study, where it is explained how the government-led PREVENT initiative received criticism for singling out Muslim communities and was even accused of spying on Muslim citizens. Third, prevention programmes are more effective if they have an objective that is wider than solely countering or preventing violent extremism. A focus on building strong, inclusive and resilient communities and addressing issues that concern them helps create a solid base of support for the programme;
Offer training to all professionals working with Islamist radicalised women and girls. Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon. All professionals dealing with radicalised Islamist women and girls should be aware of the multifaceted dynamics of (female) radicalisation, how to best approach radicalised females and their families, and how to offer support and counselling. Training should take place in the form of case studies and speaking directly with experts who have dealt with multiple cases. There should be a helpline for all working with extremists so they can discuss difficult cases with experts and make correct decisions;
Stimulate and facilitate cooperation between existing initiatives in an (online) support network. Organisations from different European Member States working on preventing female radicalisation can learn from each other’s experiences. However, social infrastructure often differs between Member States. Therefore, it is not always possible to transfer successful approaches. It is possible to learn from successes but they cannot necessarily be transferred;
Encourage women to partake in prevention efforts. Women can be valuable contributors to PVE/CVE efforts as mentors, community organisers, intervention officers, mothers, sisters, policy advisors, educators and health care professionals. Policies and programming should encourage women, provide them with the necessary space, and offer (additional) training to support them in their efforts;
Safeguard the quality of prevention and intervention programming. The number of organisations working on prevention and intervention has rapidly increased. In order to safeguard the quality of such programmes, it is vital to ask questions such as: is the programme substantiated by academic findings? Is it evaluated? Is it registered? These questions need to be seriously examined in order to ensure the target group is offered the correct and most appropriate support.
Recommendations and considerations for prevention and intervention programmes aimed at women:
Target female specific push and pull factors that put women at risk of radicalisation and recruitment. ISIS/Da’esh has produced a highly-gendered narrative in which women are offered alternative concepts of freedom and empowerment, based on Islamic virtues. In this narrative, Western feminism is portrayed as imperialist and exclusively advantageous for white women, leaving little to no room for Islamic women and their values. ISIS/Da’esh promises women the opportunity to free themselves from the superficial and materialistic principles that are imposed on them by the West and to reclaim their true identity as intended by God. By stating that women are the hope of the Ummah, ISIS/Da’esh feeds this rhetoric and promises women perspective, meaning and self-worth. This propaganda message, which resonates with different women and girls, suggests that a search for belonging and for meaning in life is important driving factors in the radicalisation of different women and girls. Prevention and intervention efforts should incorporate this in their programming;
Address female specific vulnerabilities that can increase the exposure of women and girls to radicalisation. A Dutch practitioner argues for example that girls in search of answers about their sexuality within Islam have an increased risk of being targeted by recruiters, especially if such issues are not addressed within the family sphere. Programming aimed at answering such questions and raising awareness among parents about this increased exposure could help obviate this vulnerability;
Recognise female specific enabling factors. Research shows that women and girls experience different enabling factors in their radicalisation than their male counterparts. A study by Pearson and Winterbotham reports for example that Islamist women, due to their choice of attire, have an increased risk of experiencing discrimination, which can cause feelings of exclusion. This could spiral into an increased vulnerability to radicalisation. Prevention and interventionist strategies and programmes aiming at identity and resilience should take this gender difference into account;
Account for female specific issues in intervention and reintegration programming. In line with findings of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), intervention efforts should be tailor-made, meeting the requirements of each specific individual. In general, such an approach will include individual coaching, family support and psychological and religious counselling. RAN raises awareness that quite often, women and girls who have joined or attempted to join ISIS/Da’esh have troubled family relationships and histories of abuse and/or sexual violence. In addition, in the case of women or girls returning to their families, issues including those related to honour and shame need to be addressed. In those cases, RAN recommends a risk assessment to establish whether it is safe for those women or girls to return home;
Raise awareness of women’s increased exposure to online recruitment and of female specific online recruitment tactics. It is generally agreed that the internet can play a crucial enabling factor in radicalisation processes. Studies suggest Islamic women and girls experience an increased vulnerability to online radicalisation, as traditional gender norms and gender expectations affect how women engage in the public sphere. Consequently, it is important to raise awareness of recruitment tactics used on social media and how to respond in an early stage, for example through education;
Make use of the opportunity that the Internet can provide. The internet can be an important tool to spread counter-narratives and to tackle radicalisation by deploying the same tactic as recruiters. Effective counter-narratives require addressing female specific issues. In addition, programmes exist that can help identify women and girls searching for answers online. An operative can reach out to these women and eventually invite them to a closed network where she/he can attempt to move the woman or girl away from extremist messaging.
IPOL_STU(2017)596838_EN.pdf
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